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Abstract 
We assess the impact on CEO pay (including salary, cash bonus, and benefits in kind) of changes 
in both accounting and shareholder returns in 99 British companies in the years 1972-89. After 
correcting for heterogeneity biases inherent in the standard specifications of the problem, we find 
a strong positive relationship between CEO pay and within-company changes in shareholder 
returns, and no statistically significant relationship between CEO pay and within-company 
changes in accounting returns. Differences between firms in long-term average profitability do 
appear to have a substantial effect on CEO pay, while differences between firms in shareholder 
returns add nothing to the within-firm pay dynamics.These findings call into question the 
rationale for explicitly share-based incentive schemes. 
 
1. Introduction  
Is the pay of CEOs – salary, cash bonus, and benefits in-kind – responsive to changes in a 
company's shareholder returns? Even if it is, is it more responsive to accounting rates of return 
than to shareholder returns? The assumption that the response of pay to market forces has been 
weaker than that to internal measures of performance such as accounting profits has been an 
important rationale for the proliferation of share options, LTIPs, and other stock market-based 
top-ups to executive compensation packages in both British and American companies.  
Share options became an important element in British executive compensation packages only in 
1984, following a tax reform which gave this form of compensation preferential treatment. 
Although share options have been common in many American companies since 1948, when a 
similar tax reform took effect in the US, a majority of large American companies only began to 
include share options in CEO compensation packages in the mid-1980s (Hall and Liebman, 
1998). There is no doubt that, with share-based pay, the rewards received by CEOs for improved 
stock market performance are far higher than they had been; the findings for British (Main et al., 
1996) and American (Boschen and Smith, 1995; Hall and Liebman, 1998) companies are in 
agreement on this point. If shareholders find it to their advantage to offer such powerful 
incentives, and if increasing shareholder wealth increases total welfare, then it is hard to fault the 
growth of share-based executive compensation. But there are reasons to doubt both conditions in 
the preceding sentence, and for that reason to ask whether the old pay systems were really the 
recipes for bureaucratic complacency they have been made out to be.  
In this paper we assess the impact on basic CEO pay of changes in both accounting and 
shareholder returns in 99 British companies in the years 1972-89. We examine both within-firm 
and between-firm effects, in order to distinguish between variations in pay which are due to 
performance contingency, and variations which are due to lasting differences between companies 
in rates of return. We correct for time-wise heterogeneity in the elasticity of pay to firm size, and 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the pay-returns relationships. We assess the effect on pay of 
within-and between-firm differences in returns in light of the within- and between-firm variation 
in the relevant variables.  
The paper is organized as follows. Theoretical and empirical issues are outlined in Section 2. 
Data are described in Section 3, estimators and estimation strategy are discussed in Section 4, 
and estimation results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical and Empirical Issues  
Rosen (1992) summarized the research on the relationship between CEO pay and shareholder 
returns as finding that, prior to the explosion of share-based incentives, the semi-elasticity of 
CEO pay to shareholder returns ranged from 0.1 to 0.15. Jensen and Murphy (1990) had found 
the elasticity toward the bottom of this range, and had concluded that this was far too low to be 
in keeping with agency theory. Their study has been influential, yet its benchmark for an 
efficient contract is a world in which the CEO is the firm's sole residual claimant; the authors 
acknowledge, but do not quantify, problems of CEO risk aversion and limits on the ability of the 
CEO re bear risk (due re limited wealth). Taking just the first of these (risk aversion) into 
account, Haubrich (1994) shows that Jensen and Murphy's estimates are, in fact, consistent with 
standard principal – agent models of the shareholder – CEO relationship.  
CEOs may, of course, be rewarded for a number of different things at the same time. The 
magnitude of the reward for stock market performance should be evaluated in comparison with 
other rewards. Of particular concern have been incentives which are 'managerial', which is to say 
incentives for serving the interests of a particular class of insiders rather than shareholders. It is 
often argued, for instance, that the positive relationship between CEO pay and company size is 
so strong that CEOs have an incentive to increase the size of their firm, regardless of shareholder 
returns (Baker et al., 1988; Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Meeks and Whittington, 1975). Yet there are 
good reasons why the top managers of large firms should be paid more than those of small ones, 
and the observed elasticities of CEO pay to firm size can be easily explained in terms either of 
incentives for effort (Calvo and Wellisz, 1978), or sorting by ability (Calvo and Wellisz, 1979; 
Rosen, 1982).  
A more difficult case to answer is the responsiveness of pay to alternative measures of financial 
performance, such as accounting rates of return. If the stock market is efficient at valuing 
expected future earnings, then the additional information imparted by accounting measures of 
performance should be more closely correlated with free cash flow than with shareholder value. 
A strong response of executive pay to accounting profits after controlling for shareholder returns 
would, then, suggest an incentive structure with managerial orientation. On the other hand, a case 
can be made (Rogerson, 1997; Rosen, 1992) that shareholders should actually prefer to measure 
performance on the basis of accounting profits because they contain less noise than stock market 
measures. Be this as it may, the use of shareholder returns has become standard in recent studies 
of CEO pay. Many earlier studies, however, use accounting rates of return, and even some recent 
ones use earnings per share. Rosen's summary of these findings is that the semi-elasticity of CEO 
pay to accounting returns is about 1.0, that of pay to shareholder returns is in the range of 0.1-
0.15.  
Even if both measures of performance were equally good, we would expect the dynamics of the 
two to differ. Shareholder returns include both changes in share price and dividend payments. 
The change in share price should reflect changes in the market's expectations about the firm's 
future earnings; firms generally try to keep dividend payments steady, and use changes in them 
to signal changed expectations of future earnings. While changes in accounting returns do 
contain information about future earnings, they also contain information about one-off gains and 
losses. While performance-contingent pay could plausibly be linked to both transitory and 
permanent gains, we would expect the magnitude of the rewards for transitory gains to be lower. 
On this basis, even if accounting and shareholder returns impart similar information in the long 
run, we would expect a weaker immediate response to changes in accounting returns than to 
shareholder returns, but a comparable response in the long run.  
 
3. Data  
We have data on CEO remuneration, sales, accounting and share returns for a balanced panel of 
99 firms in the years 1970-1989.1 Remuneration is what is given in the company's annual report 
as 'total remuneration' of the highest paid director. For the most part this corresponds to the 
salary plus bonus listing in US annual reports, but it also includes in-kind payments. 
Remuneration and sales are deflated using the RPI. Remuneration, sales and company accounts 
variables come from the Cambridge/DTI Databank of Company Accounts, and share price 
information from the London Business School's London Shareprice Database. Finance, 
insurance, and property concerns are not included in the dataset, but other service firms are, 
along with manufacturing. Summary statistics appear in Table 1, and the firms are listed in 
Appendix 1.  
The firms in this sample tend to be fairly large, for two reasons: first, large firms were more 
likely to have survived through the entire period in question and, second, through the vicissitudes 
of sample selection for the original data set, data on large firms was more consistently collected 
than data on small firms. Another limitation of the data is that it does not include information 
about options and other share-based remuneration. For more recent data this would be a serious 
limitation, but for most of the period under study these were not an important part of executive 
compensation. The data are suitable for the essentially historical question asked here: prior to the 
widespread adoption of share options, how responsive was the pay of CEOs in the UK to 
changes in accounting and stock market performance?  
We define shareholder return for the firm's fiscal year as:  
SRET = (Dividend payments + Change in share price) / Starting share price  
where share prices are adjusted for rights issues. Our measure of accounting return is return on 
capital employed (ROCE), defined as:  
ROCE = Profits before interest and taxes / Average net assets  
Table 2 compares the overall, between-firm and within-firm variation in these two measures of 
returns. The overall standard deviation of SRET is much larger than that of RACE. This entire 
difference is accounted for by the greater within-firm variation in SRET.  
 
4. Estimation Strategy  
We are interested in the response of CEO pay to both between-firm and within-firm variation in 
accounting and shareholder returns. Estimation of the 'between' response requires simply a cross 
sectional regression on firm means:  
PAY*i = α + β(1)SALES*i + β(2)ROCE*i + β(3)SRET*i + ε(i)   (1) 
where PAY is the logarithm of the basic pay of the highest paid director, SALES is the logarithm 
of turnover, ROCE is return on capital employed, and SRET is shareholder return; for any 
variable x, xi* = Σt xit/t. The between estimator has been shown (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) to 
capture the long-run aspect of a wide range of dynamic processes. We should note, however, that 
                                                 
1 The Cambridge/DTI Databank stopped adding observations in 1990, when the relevant functions of the British 
Statistical Office were privatized. The Databank includes accounts data on a varying sample of companies from the 
mid-1950s to that point. Directors' remuneration data are provided from 1969. The London Business School London 
Shareprice Database substantially increases its coverage from 1971. The overlap of the two datasets gives us our 
period of study. 
'long run' here could be too long to make sense as performance-contingent-pay: if a firm has 
consistently high returns over 18 years and consistently high CEO pay over the same period, this 
does not tell us that CEO pay is adjusted to changes in returns with a frequency that would be 
behaviourally important.  
The between-firm estimates of responsiveness to both accounting and market returns are, at 0.94 
and 0.10 respectively, in rough accord with Rosen's generalization, though at the low end (Table 
3, column 1).  
Estimating the response to within-firm variation in returns is more involved. Pesaran and Smith 
show that most 'within' estimators for panel data (e.g. fixed effects) produce inconsistent 
dynamic estimates when there is cross sectional heterogeneity in the underlying parameters (i.e. 
different slopes for different firms). They show that this bias can be avoided by estimating a 
separate time series regression for each firm and averaging the results, provided the coefficients 
of the individual time series are distributed independently of the regressors. Only one study of 
executive pay (Smith and Szymanski, 1995) has used this approach; because it both used a 
shorter panel and lacked data on shareholder returns, that study was not able to address the range 
of questions considered here. We use the Hildreth-Houck-Swamy variant of the random 
coefficients estimator (Hsiao, 1986), as implemented in LIMDEP.  
Cross sectional heterogeneity is not a concern as regards the firm size effect (measured here by 
sales). This is not because it does not exist, it does (see Cosh, 1975), but because the effect is not 
a dynamic one: static and dynamic within-firm estimates, between and simple OLS estimates 
using the same data, all give us similar estimates of the elasticity of pay to sales. There is, 
however, considerable time-wise heterogeneity in the firm size effect. In the sample firms over 
the period of this study the real level of executive pay takes large swings, both down and up 
(Figure 1). At the same time, in annual cross sectional regressions, both the intercept and the 
coefficient on sales change considerably, the latter ranging from 0.21 to 0.32. The change can be 
largely explained as a function of changes in earnings differentials throughout the managerial 
hierarchy, without reference to financial performance (Guy, 1999). Since most of the variation in 
pay is explained by differences in firm size (in these data, a simple cross sectional regression of 
log sales on log pay, yields an R2 of 0.65), an estimation procedure which incorrectly imposes an 
assumption of homogeneity produces problems.  
To understand the effect of these changes in pay-size elasticity on the dynamic model, it is useful 
to think of the problem as a two step process, first regressing pay on sales, and then regressing 
the accounting and market return measures on the residual (Goldberger, 1991). Consider three 
ways of carrying out the first step. One is a simple regression of pay on sales, with pooled data:  
PAYi,t = α + βSALESi,t + vi,t (2a)  
Second, we transform observations of pay and sales by taking deviations from annual sample 
means: for any variable x, xi,t** = xi,t - Σ ixit/n. This is similar, though not identical, (Pesaran et 
al., 1997) to the inclusion of time dummies in the model,2 which would allow the intercept, but 
not the coefficient on sales, to vary by year:  
PAY**i,t = α + βSALES**i,t + vi,t (2b)  
Finally, we can allow both coefficients to vary, either by interacting SALES with the time 
dummy, or by estimating a separate cross sectional regression for each year:  
PAYi,t = αt + βSALESi,t + vi,t (2c)  
In Figure 2 we plot, by year, the means of the residuals for the first and fourth quartiles of firms 
in our panel, ranked by average real sales. We have, at this stage, omitted the financial 
                                                 
2 We do not use time dummies because, in the random coefficients estimates which follow, they would cause 
colinearity in each of the underlying time series regressions. 
performance variables, so we cannot call this model correctly specified; still we would expect the 
mean residual for any quartile to be close to zero in each year, and any large or systematic 
deviation from zero is a sign of misspecification.  
In 2a (the first panel of Figure 2), mean residuals for both larger and smaller firms are negative 
from 1974 to 1983, and positive from 1985 to 1989; the extremes of high and low are greater for 
the larger firms. After de-meaning (2b), the mean residuals for each group are much reduced, but 
in terms of signs the time pattern persists for the larger firms, and is now reversed for the smaller 
firms. The residuals from annual cross sections (2c) show no such pattern. For this reason we 
prefer the residuals from 2c as the dependent variable in our dynamic models; however, because 
studies using either levels or time dummies/annual demeaning are common, we report such 
results for comparison.  
We estimate:  
vi,t = αi + λivi,t-1 + ΣtβriROCEi,r + ΣtβsiSRETi,s + εi,t   (3) 
where v is the residual from (2c). The subscript i on the coefficients reminds us that in the first 
stage a separate regression is estimated for each firm. We test down from current and two lagged 
values for both measures of returns. The Schwartz criterion guides us to t and t-1 for both 
variables.  
For comparison, we then estimate:  
PAYi,t = αi + λiPAYi,t-1 + β1iSALESi,t + β2iROCEi,t + β3iROCEi,t-1 + β4iSRETi,t  + 
β5iSRETi,t-1  + εi,t  (4a)  
This is analogous to (2a), in that neither the intercept nor the sales coefficient is allowed to vary 
over time. We also estimate:  
PAY**i,t = αt + λiPAY**i,t-1 + β1iSALES**i,t + β2iROCEi,t + β3iROCEi,t-1 + β4iSRETi,t  +  
β5iSRETi,t-1 + εi,t  (4b)  
where x** indicates a variable de-meaned by year, analogous to (2b). Finally, we estimate the 
same model after de-meaning the financial performance variables as well as pay and sales:  
PAY**i,t = α + λiPAY**i,t-1 + β1iSALES**i,t + β2iROCE**i,t + β3iROCE**i,t-1 + 
β4iSRET**i,t  + β5iSRET**i,t-1 + εi,t  (4c)  
 
5. Estimation Results  
 
5.1. Within-firm and Between-firm Responses  
Table 3 reports results for ( 1), ( 3) and (4a, b, c). Long-run effects in the random coefficients 
models are (β1 + β2)/(1 - λ). Comparing ( 3) with ( 1), we see that the estimated shareholder 
returns effect in ( 3) is of approximately the same size, but in ( 3) it is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. The coefficient on accounting returns in ( 3) is about a quarter of that in ( 1), but 
with almost as large a standard error and hence of no statistical significance in ( 3).  
These coefficients are, of course, estimated on different dimensions of the data, and to assess 
their behavioural significance we need to consider the within-firm and between-firm variation in 
the relevant variables. Dynamic response of pay to within-firm changes in performance can be 
interpreted as performance-contingent pay. The long-run properties of the same dynamics should 
be captured by the between estimates. Sensitivity of pay to a one-standard deviation change in 
the performance variables is reported in Table 4.  
The estimated between-firm and within-firm effects for SRET are roughly the same for ( 1) and 
(3) (0.10 and 0.12, respectively), and we can regard the between estimate as a simple reflection 
of the dynamic within result. Within firms, a 1-year one-standard deviation improvement in 
shareholder returns produces additional CEO pay of 6.6% in that and subsequent years.  
The effect on pay of a between-firm difference in ROCE is much stronger than the dynamic 
within-firm effect. This suggests that most of the positive relationship between pay and 
accounting profits is of too long term a nature to be the result of performance-contingent 
remuneration. It is consistent, however, with at least two alternate explanations: first, with the 
matching of more highly regarded executives with companies which are consistently more 
profitable; second, with the possibility that CEOs have power within firms which enables them 
to share in long-term rents – the more the rent, the higher the pay. We do not have the means 
here to shed light on these contending explanations.  
 
5.2. Consequences of Ignoring Changes in the Pay-Firm Size Relationship  
Comparing results from ( 3) with those from (4a, b, c), we see that, had we not corrected for 
time-wise heterogeneity in the pay-firm size relationship, we would have obtained within 
estimates more in keeping with conventional wisdom: the response of pay to changes in profit 
would have appeared both larger and statistically stronger, while the response of pay to changes 
in shareholder return would have appeared in most cases smaller and in all cases statistically 
weaker. When all variables are in levels (4a) we get high estimates of the long-run effects of both 
accounting and share returns on pay, both significant but only at the 10% level. When we de-
mean pay and sales (4b), both of these estimates fall, and accounting returns becomes 
statistically insignificant. De-meaning all variables (4c) produces no big changes from (4b) in the 
size of the long-run estimates, but now both are statistically insignificant.  
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper considers a question from the recent history of executive pay in Great Britain: prior to 
the widespread use of share options in compensation packages, was the pay of top executives 
responsive to stock market returns, to accounting profits, or to both?  
After adjusting for time-wise heterogeneity in the firm size effect, we find that the within-firm 
response of CEO pay (salary, bonus and benefits in kind) to shareholder returns is much stronger 
– in terms both of proportion of salary and statistical significance – than is the response to 
accounting returns. While theory offers little guidance to the size of the incentive that would be 
optimal from the standpoint of the shareholders (Rosen, 1992), much less for other stakeholders 
in the firm, the strength of the relationship does tell us that British CEOs during the 1970s and 
1980s had much more to gain from improving share returns than from improving accounting 
returns, even without taking share ownership or share options into account. Since many top 
executives have shareholdings as well, this finding provides a lower bound for both the relative 
and absolute importance of share returns in the remuneration of these CEOs. This is contrary to 
earlier findings about the reward structure for CEOs prior to the advent of share options and 
other compensation schemes designed to align CEO interests with those of shareholders. It calls 
into question that rationale for such schemes.  
The relationship of pay to between-firm differences in both shareholder and accounting returns 
is, in contrast, in keeping with the earlier findings. Comparing these between-firm results 
together with our within-firm findings, we infer that in this case at least, the widely observed 
positive relationship between CEO pay and accounting returns is mostly due to very long run 
differences in profitability between firms, rather than to a performance-contingent element of the 
pay package.  
When we fail to correct for time-wise heterogeneity in the pay-firm size elasticity, we get much 
different results. Since this heterogeneity comes from changes over time in the distribution of 
real pay levels, it is potentially a problem in any executive pay study using a long panel of data, 
especially in a period where the distribution of earnings changes substantially. The statistical 
methodology employed here provides a way to address that problem. Future research should 
focus on applying this methodology to more recent, complete, and disaggregated measures of 
executive remuneration. In the case of the UK, the assembly of panels of such data is a project in 
itself.3  
                                                 
3 Long panels which include data on CEO share options are available for the US. For the UK, up to the mid-1990s, 
this data was effectively available only with the cooperation of individual companies. For most other countries in the 
world, data on the remuneration of individual executives is not publicly reported.  
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Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics – selected years, 1982 prices  
 
Variable              Mean     Standard     Minimum      Maximum 
         Deviation 
1972 
CEO pay           110818.22    57697.06    24370.52    284956.53 
Sales             920067.86  1278850.87    17195.65   7364782.50 
ROCE                    0.2        0.10        0.04         0.56 
Share return           0.57        0.74       -0.26         4.07 
 
1978 
CEO pay            81418.20    54386.09    25818.18    516424.25 
Sales            1101212.90  1452715.45    17699.50   8585227.00 
ROCE                   0.18        0.09       -0.03         0.53 
Share return            0.3        0.42       -0.46         2.04 
 
1986 
CEO pay           143114.27   130574.59    28046.42    970986.44 
Sales            1177019.86  1713532.47     5522.75   9802708.00 
ROCE                   0.20        0.11       -0.12         0.47 
Share return           0.56        0.64       -0.15         4.42 
 
1989 
CEO pay           198912.18   163073.48    36124.79   1111777.88 
Sales            1215050.97  1678721.86     3747.19  10813629.00 
ROCE                   0.21        0.18       -0.89         0.76 
Share return           0.24         0.3       -0.61         1.11 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Within- and between-firm variation in returns  
 
Variable                             Mean     Standard deviation 
 
Shareholder return 
 Overall                      0.27            0.57 
 Between                                      0.08 
 Within                                       0.57 
 
Return on capital employed 
 Overall                      0.17            0.12 
 Between                                      0.07 
 Within                                       0.10 
Table 3. Regression results a 
 
 
Within-firm random coefficients models  
1 Between 
(firm means) 
model, real 
levels 
3 Residual from 
annual cross 
sections 
 
4a Real levels 4b De-mean 
pay,sales 
 
4c De-mean 
all 
 
Dependent variable t-1  0.63** 0.75** 0.57** 0.57** 
  (0.041) (0.037) (0.043) (0.044) 
ROCE t 0.94* 0.067 0.29 0.15 0.19 
 (0.40) (0.13) (0.18) (0.15) (0.14) 
ROCE t-1  0.02 0.035 0.039 0.0011 
  (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13) 
SRET t 0.10 0.02 0.016 0.018 0.015 
 (0.33) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) 
SRET t-1  0.023 0.024 0.017 0.016 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) 
Log (sales) 0.25**  0.11 0.082 0.096 
 (0.018)  (0.075) (0.058) (0.053) 
Constant 8.03** -0.047 1.53 -0.056 -0.019 
 (0.27) (0.025) (0.87) (0.10) (0.089) 
 Long-run effects 
 Between 
estimates 
Random coefficient estimates
Coefficient: (βt + βt-1)/(1-λ)
ROCE 0.94* 0.24 1.29 0.45 0.44 
 (0.40) (0.33) (0.76) (0.32) (0.31) 
SRET 0.10 0.12* 0.16 0.081 0.071 
 (0.33) (0.056) (0.093) (0.048) (0.067) 
  
                                                 
a  There is no R2 for the random coefficients estimator. Regressor selection is based on Schwartz Bayesian criterion 
based on the sum of log likelihoods from model 3. These statistics are not reported here because the five models in 
the table have, between them, four different dependent variables (1: mean pay by firm, 3: residual from annual cross 
sectional logarithmic regressions of pay on sales; 4a: log of real pay; 4b, 4c: deviations of log of real pay from 
annual sample means).  
Coefficients significant at 0.01 **; 0.05 *. Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors and significance levels for 
long-run dynamic estimates are from Wald tests.  
 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage changes in pay for 1 SD change in returns  
 
                                   Between (1)        Within (3) 
 
Shareholder return                     0.8                6.6 
Return on capital employed             6.3                2.4 
Figure 1. Mean real CEO remuneration.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean residuals, 1st and 4th quartiles.  
 
 
 
Appendix 1. Firms in sample  
600 GROUP PLC (THE)  
AARONSON BROS PLC  
ALLIED LYONS PLC  
ASSOCIATED PAPER INDUSTRIES PLC  
B S G INTERNATIONAL PLC  
BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS PLC  
BASS PLC  
BERISFORD INTERNATIONAL PLC  
BICC PLC  
BLUE CIRCLE INDUSTRIES PLC  
BOC GROUP (THE)  
BODDINGTON GROUP PLC  
BOOSEY & HAWKES PLC  
BOOTS COMPANY PLC (THE)  
BOWATER INDUSTRIES PLC  
BOWTHORPE HOLDINGS PLC  
BPB INDUSTRIES PLC  
BRAMMER PLC  
C H BAILEY PLC  
CADBURY SCHWEPPES PLC  
CAFFYNS PLC  
CHLORIDE GROUP  
COOKSON GROUP PLC  
COURTAULDS PLC  
D R G PLC  
DAVY CORPORATION PLC  
DE LA RUE CO PLC  
DELTA PLC  
DOWTY GROUP PLC  
E R F (HOLDINGS) PLC  
FISONS PLC  
FITCH LOVELL PLC  
FOSECO PLC  
G K N PLC  
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY PLC (THE)  
GLYNWED INTERNATIONAL GROUP PLC  
GRAMPIAN HOLDINGS PLC  
GRANADA GROUP PLC  
GRAND METROPOLITAN PLC  
GREAT UNIVERSAL STORES PLC (THE)  
GREENALL WHITLEY PLC  
GUINNESS PLC  
HARDYS & HANSON PLC  
HAWKER SIDDELEY GROUP PLC  
HELENE PLC  
HICKSON INTERNATIONAL  
HOPKINSONS HOLDINGS PLC  
IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PLC  
J A DEVENISH PLC  
JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC  
LAIRD GROUP  
LINREAD PLC  
LOW & BONAR PLC  
LUCAS INDUSTRIES PLC  
MACARTHYS PLC  
MANGANESE BRONZE HOLDINGS PLC  
MARKS & SPENCER PLC  
MARLEY PLC  
NORCROS PLC  
NORTHERN FOODS PLC  
PITTARD GARNAR PLC  
POWELL DUFFRYN  
R M C GROUP PLC  
RACAL ELECTRONICS PLC  
REED INTERNATIONAL PLC  
RENTOKIL GROUP PLC  
ROCKWARE GROUP PLC  
RUGBY GROUP PLC  
S & u STORES PLC  
SCOTFISH & NEWCASTLE BREWERIES PLC  
SEARS HOLDINGS PLC  
SMITH & NEPHEW PLC  
SMITHS INDUSTRIES PLC  
STAVELEY INDUSTRIES PLC  
T & N PLC  
TARMAC PLC  
TATE & LYLE PLC  
TESCO PLC  
THE BURTON GROUP PLC  
THE STEETLEY COMPANY LTD  
THORN EMI PLC  
TI GROUP PLC  
TOOTAL GROUP PLC  
TOZER KEMSLEY & MILBOURN (HOLDINGS) PLC  
TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT GROUP PLC  
TRUST HOUSE FORTE PLC  
UNIGATE PLC  
UNILEVER PLC  
UNITED BISCUITS (HOLDINGS) PLC  
VAUX GROUP PLC  
VICKERS PLC  
WAGON INDUSTRIAL HOLDINGS PLC  
WESTLAND GROUP PLC  
WHITBREAD & CO PLC  
WHITECROFT PLC  
WILLIAM BAIRD PLC  
WOLVERHAMPTON & DUDLEY BREWERIES PLC  
YOUNG & CO'S BREWERY PLC  
J BIBBY & SONS PLC  
 
